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Covid-19 is raging a devastating trail with the highest mortality-to-infected ratio ever for a pandemic. Lack of
vaccine and therapeutic has rendered social exclusion through lockdown as the singular mode of containment.
Harnessing the predictive powers of Machine Learning within a 6 dimensional infection kinetic model, depict-
ing interactive evolution of 6 infection stages - healthy susceptible (H), predisposed comorbid susceptible (P ),
infected (I), recovered (R), herd immunized (V ) and mortality (D) - the model, PHIRVD, provides the first
accurate mortality prediction of 18 countries at varying stages of strategic lockdown, up to 30 days beyond last
data training. PHIRVD establishes mortality-to-infection ratio as the correct pandemic descriptor, substituting
reproduction number, and highlights the importance of early and prolonged but strategic lockdown to contain
secondary relapse.
Significance Statement:
1. accurate prediction of the day-by-day mortality profiles of 18 countries, 30 days beyond the last data of data
training,
2. precise quantification of the impact of early-vs-later lockdown impositions,
3. accurate prediction of secondary relapse timelines,
4. establishment of mortality-to-infected ratio as the correct pandemic descriptor substituting the popular
choice of reproduction number, a proven failure in predicting future infection kinetics and secondary surge.
The outcomes have potential to redefine healthy policy landscape, particularly in light of secondary relapse and
possible future SARS-COV/Ebola group incursion.
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2INTRODUCTION
Deadlier than all pandemics in the last 100 years, barring HIV, Covid-19 rages on despite imposition of movement restrictions
as well as clinical testing and community health measures[1, 2]. As of 4 August 2020, SARS-COV-2 has infected ca 18.5
million worldwide with ca 700,000 dead. Covid-19 containment has been a major strategic issue for governments worldwide,
with particular emphasis on the correct lockdown timing and span. Alarming belated infection spurt have been registered in
over-populated countries like India, Brazil and Iran with early and extensive lockdowns. While the low mortality rates exhibited
by low-resourced yet densely populated Asian countries have been attributed to the relative youth of the populations [3], rich
and sparsely populated Sweden depicts an alarming dead-to-infected ratio in contrast to its European neighbours [4].
Quarantine has been advised as the best infection control measure [5, 6]. This has led to key questions as to the ideal start point
and the absolute span of the ensuing lockdown. Major cases in support of lockdown are Vietnam and Cuba, that have claimed
almost no death [7, 8], although such claims have been questioned [9]. In countries like Italy, the UK, the US, Sweden and Brazil,
with strategic reluctance for early lockdown, comparatively softer prohibition lockdown protocols have admittedly transpired to
gruesome statistics. On the other hand, European countries like Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France as also non-
European countries like Australia, New Zealand and Korea who enforced early lockdowns initially registered remarkably low
infection and mortality rates [10], with 1.0 < R0 < 2.0 during lockdown, that spiked later (www.worldometers.info).
Many suffered post-lockdown relapse [11, 12] with a sudden spurt in infection [13]. Regions like India, Iran and New York
State, with variable quarantine measures, have all seen late infection surges. While India resorted to an early clampdown with an
early withdrawal, New York State resorted to a late lockdown, but both with similar numerical implications, a feature attributed
to inevitable movement of migrant workers [14].
Analyzes of the SARS epidemic of 2003 showed that case isolation and contact tracing [1, 15], while highly effective if
implemented at early stages, become ineffectual if the basic infection spread occurs before symptomatic detection [16, 17]. This
finding was revisited in Covid-19 transmission kinetics [18] pointing to the importance of appropriate early (pre-symptomatic)
stage strategizing. Other studies stress the importance of combining isolation [19], social distancing with widespread testing
[20] and contact tracing [2]. Initial predictive models [14] used data from Wuhan and Italy [20]. Both efforts suffer from a lack
of robustness due to inaccurate future prediction that is reliant on sparse data, devoid of any inherent ML training protocol.The
first predictive study used a Bayesian inference structure on a simplistic SIRV model [21, 23], using infection statistics from
Germany. While a move in the right direction, it suffered from two key deficiencies: lack of a time evolving death rate as an
independent dynamical variable and over-reliance on infection statistics in predicting mortality rate. [19] addressed this, but it
lacked the probabilistic kernel of [21]. Another issue that has often been overlooked is the role of a containment strategy in
counterpoising the contagion of the disease by identifying and blocking the key nodal links in the complex signaling network
defining the chemical pathways [22].
RESULTS
Infection Kinetics of Healthy and Comorbid Susceptible
COVID-19 infection propagation epidemiology clearly points to the need for analyzing the vastly different infection and
mortality profiles of the healthy versus the comorbid susceptible groups. Our key target is to study this interactive infection
propagation ad then predict future mortality and infection profiles, emphasizing mortality as the key policy indicator. The
present article is the first to marry a robust Susceptible(S)-Infection(I)-Recovered(R)-Vaccinated(V) (SIRV) structure [24] with
a Machine Learning (ML) prediction kernel, using a multi-layered error filtration structure, to generate a predictive model called
PHIRVD (see Materials and Methods). PHIRVD delivers three major successes at an unprecedented level of accuracy: prediction
of the number of infected and dead over the next 30 days (validated using sparse data) for each of the 18 countries considered,
a comparative analysis of the impact of lockdown using multiple withdrawal dates for 6 worst-hit countries with high ongoing
infection rates, and a detailed temporal profile of future reproduction numbers that can be (and have been) verified against real
data. PHIRVD also establishes mortality-to-infection ratio as the key dynamic pandemic descriptor instead of reproduction
number.
Mathematical Model - PHIRVD
Our compartmentalised Covid-19 pandemic kinetics uses a 6-dimensional dynamical system combining SIR and SEIR kernels
(30, 31), called PHIRVD:
3FIG. 1: Schematic diagram outlining the infection kinetic profile of our model PHIRVD: Healthy Susceptible (H); Predisposed
Comorbid Susceptible (P ); Infected (I); Recovered (R); Herd immunized (V ) and Dead (D).
dH
dt
= −β1HI+ q1HR+ q2HV − h2vH − γH,
dP
dt
= −β2PI − (γ + δ)P+ q1PR+ q2PV − p2vP,
dI
dt
= (β1H + β2P + β3R)I − (γ + ζ)I − wI,
dR
dt
= wI − β3RI − γR− q1HR− q1PR,
dV
dt
= −(q2H + q2P )V − γV + h2vH + p2vP,
dD
dt
= γ(H +R+ V ) + (γ + δ)P + (γ + ζ)I. (1)
The parameters in the model characterize the infection rate of healthy agents (β1), infection rate of agents with pre-existing
health conditions (β2), relapse rate (β3), conversion rates of recovered to healthy susceptible (q1H ) and previously “immuned”
to healthy susceptible (q2H ), conversion rates of recovered to pre-existing susceptible (q1P ) and previously “immuned” to pre-
existing susceptible (q2P ), death rate due to non-Covid interference (γ), additional death rate due to agents with pre-existing
conditions (δ) and that due to infected (ζ), recovery rate (w), rate at which healthy (h2v) and pre-existing susceptible (p2v)
groups are quarantined. Our focus being Covid-19 infection and mortality statistics, we neglect death (γ = 0) and infection rate
(δ = 0) due to all non-Covid causes. Furthermore, data strongly suggests that β1  β2. Hence, the infection rate of H-group is
considered to be a small fraction (λ) of the P -group, i.e. β1 = β2λ. The death variableD thus acts like a “sink” of the dynamical
system ensuring a population conservation inbuilt within the model (H + P + I +R+ V +D = constant).
In training our model, we find it useful to define an extra variable Ic(t), which represents the cumulative number of those
infected upto a given date. In other words, it includes not only those who are currently infected, but also those who have since
recovered or died, i. e. dIcdt = (β1H + β2P + β3R)I. Since we have considered relapse in our model, it is to be noted that
Ic(t) 6= I(t) +R(t) +D(t).
Data repositories
Identifying the infection kinetics of Covid-19 as an interactive evolution process involving six time evolving population density
variables: healthy susceptible (H), susceptible with pre-existing conditions or comorbidity (P ), infected (I), recovered (R), natu-
rally immuned (i.e. a clone for vaccinated V ) and dead (D), the PHIRVD model uses statistics from the Johns Hopkins Covid-19
4database [25] to accurately predict mortality and infection statistics of 18 Asian, European and American countries. Data thresh-
old was set beyond the first 19 days of low (or no) infection, followed by data training between 10 February 2020 to 29 June
2020. Results were later cross-verified from other databases e.g. US: https://usafacts.org; EU: https://data.
europa.eu/; UK: https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/; India: https://www.covid19india.org/. The
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) [26] infrastructure in PHIRVD trains the repository data to probabilistically pre-
dict the 17 parameters of the infection kinetic model (see Materials and Methods). Unlike previous predictive Machine Learning
models [14, 19–21, 23, 24], this structure allows more dynamic adaptive control of the infection kinetic estimation resulting in
a highly accurate predictive module.
Mortality and Infection: Prediction against Reality
The 18 countries or regions under study were divided into 4 infection classes, the first three based on decreasing mortality-to-
infection ratio for countries past their infection peak: UK, Netherlands, Sweden, New York State (Class A); Germany, Korea,
Australia, Russia, Vietnam (Class B); and Italy, Spain, Hubei (Class C). Class Class D comprises India, Poland, Iran, France,
Portugal and Brazil, with ongoing infection regimes. We deliberately chose New York State instead of the entire United States
due to its high population density and tourist/ worker traffic that is quite different from the national average.
(a) UK infection profiles. (b) UK mortality profiles.
FIG. 2: Infection (Fig 2a) and mortality (Fig 2b) epidemiology for the UK (Class A). Outsets represent cumulative statistics
while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively. Here “0” marks 22 January 2020; data
training between 10 February to 29 June 2020.
With the number of reported cases being highly dependent on the number of daily testings, not necessarily in agreement
with the actual disease propagation dynamics, we observe some deviations between the simulated I(t) and the actual number
of reported cases. On the other hand, D(t) is less affected by the testing rate. Since we are using mortality statistics with the
same weightage as the infected data, we prioritize mortality prediction. We note that daily training of any epidemiological model
will invariably achieve better data match, as many studies have shown, but they all lack the key predictive ability, that our ML
embedded propagation kinetic model thrives on.
Comparative statistics for our Class A representative, the UK, is shown in Figure 2. The blue region marks the training zone
that fixes the parameters. Based on the highest mortality to infection ratio in each group, the representative countries for the
other 3 classes are Germany (Class B), Italy (Class C), India (Class D). Figures 3, 4 and 5 represent infection statistics for Class
B (Germany), C (Italy) and D (India) respectively (other plots in Appendix II). Chi-square tested (see Materials and Methods
for Chi-squared statistic used) accuracy chart in Table I clearly points to the veracity of the accuracy claim made. On the other
hand, Vietnam presents an interesting case. With a reported zero mortality rate notwithstanding high population density, it has
been repeatedly cited as an example of early quarantine success. The model tracks even such an exceptional case to a moderate
level of accuracy (in Appendix II). The outsets and insets respectively outline the cumulative versus the daily infection traffic.
Details for other countries, for 4 infection classes, are provided in Appendix II.
Table II presents a comparative chart of the PHIRVD model predictions versus real data, separately for the numbers of
5(a) Germany infection profiles. (b) Germany mortality profiles.
FIG. 3: Infection (Fig 3a) and mortality (Fig 3b) epidemiology for Germany (Class B). Outsets represent cumulative statistics
while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively. Here “0” marks 22 January 2020; data
training between 10 February to 29 June 2020.
(a) Italy infection profiles. (b) Italy mortality profiles.
FIG. 4: Infection (Fig 4a) and mortality (Fig 4b) epidemiology for Italy (Class C). Outsets represent cumulative statistics while
the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively. Here “0” marks 22 January 2020; data training
between 10 February to 29 June 2020.
infected and dead, for countries representing the 4 classes with data trained between 10 February to 29 June: Class A (UK),
Class B (Germany), Class C (Italy) and Class D (India). Futuristic prediction is shown until 12 July. For other countries in each
individual class, with data training between 10 February to 10 May, 30 days’ prediction until 9 June establishes the predictive
strength of this model (see Tables S2-S5, Appendix III), error validated as shown in Table S1 (see Appendix I).
The expected number of secondary cases produced from each infected individual is traditionally defined as the basic repro-
duction number. A linear analytical estimation of reproduction number Re at fixed point leaves us with only 8 independent
parameters characterizing the secondary infection kinetics (note that a linear analytical formulation does not provide an exact
quantitative estimate but a proportional one only). The detailed calculation of Re is provided in the Materials and Methods
section. Figure 6 depicts the time evolution of secondary infection for the 4 representative countries from infection classes A-D,
6(a) India infection profiles. (b) India mortality profiles.
FIG. 5: Infection (Fig 5a) and mortality (Fig 5b) epidemiology for India (Class D). Outsets represent cumulative statistics while
the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively. Here “0” marks 22 January 2020; data training
between 10 February to 29 June 2020.
Country Daily New Infected Daily New Death
 p-value  p-value
UK 0.26 0.23 0.36 0.14
Germany 0.42 0.18 0.45 0.25
Italy 0.32 0.22 0.3 0.28
India 0.52 0.25 0.52 0.38
TABLE I: p-Values for daily new infected and dead for Class A-D representative countries between 11 Feb to 16 June 2020.
represented by the basic reproduction number R0 [29–31] (see Materials and Methods). R0 kinetics of all other countries are
provided in Appendix I. Class A countries consistently show the sharpest drop in R0 and the flattest stability period, followed
by progressive decrease in R0 decay rate and gestation span for classes B, C and D respectively. The point of note here is that
while Germany and Italy show higher levels of infection than the UK, the gestation period for the UK is a lot larger than both.
India shows a similar trend although the absolute numbers for India are a lot lower than the other three, indicating a complicated
relationship between Full Width at Half Maximum (FWHM) and gestation period.
DISCUSSION
Combining conventional infection kinetic modeling with a predictive Bayesian MCMC, PHIRVD quantifies the impact of lock-
down as a containment tool. It precisely estimates mortality statistics for 18 countries, accurate upto the next 30 days, beyond
the last date of data training. Ideal lockdown imposition and withdrawal times have been predicted and validated, including
for ongoing regimen e.g. India. PHIRVD also predicts secondary relapse timings and establishes mortality-to-infection ratio
as the key pandemic predictive descriptor instead of reproduction number. PHIRVD is also capable of analyzing the impact of
migration, an ongoing project. Our findings clearly suggest that phased lockdown is a potent containment tool but needs to be
strategically imposed, where the correct implementation and withdrawal times are paramount. Secondary infection and mortality
prediction will be key to future strategic quarantine imposition and analyzing impact of future therapeutics.
PHIRVD leads to three key outcomes. First, we present highly accurate probabilistic predictions for the numbers of infected
and dead for each country for a total of 18 countries, typically 3 weeks beyond the last date of (Machine Learned) data training.
We can safely claim that this is the first, inherently probabilistic COVID-19 model that can claim such high levels of accuracy
over such an extended time period (upto 30 days) probing in to the future and that too for all countries considered.
Second, we can precisely predict ideal lockdown withdrawal dates for the countries. The full simulations plots (in Appendix
II) clearly outlines how an increasing infection profile initially matches with decreasing numbers of pre-existing susceptible and
7PPPPPPPDays
Country
UK Germany Italy India
Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death
Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation
30/06/20 403 472 155 91 376 126 14 12 142 121 23 23 18641 17298 507 570
01/07/20 60 455 176 88 475 121 5 11 182 116 21 22 19160 17471 434 579
02/07/20 4 439 89 84 477 117 11 11 201 110 30 21 20903 17628 379 588
03/07/20 502 424 136 81 410 112 4 11 223 106 15 20 22771 17767 442 596
04/07/20 624 408 67 79 418 108 10 10 235 101 21 19 24850 17889 613 604
05/07/20 516 394 22 76 325 104 3 10 192 96 7 18 24248 17992 425 612
06/07/20 352 380 16 73 541 100 0 9 208 92 8 17 22251 18078 466 618
07/07/20 581 366 155 70 279 96 10 9 137 88 30 17 22753 18145 483 625
08/07/20 630 353 126 68 356 92 14 9 193 84 15 16 24879 18194 487 631
09/07/20 642 341 85 66 302 89 11 8 214 81 12 15 26506 18224 475 636
10/07/20 512 329 48 63 331 85 6 8 276 77 12 14 27114 18236 519 640
11/07/20 820 317 148 61 377 82 7 8 188 74 7 14 28606 18230 550 645
12/07/20 650 306 21 59 210 79 1 7 234 70 9 13 28732 18206 501 648
TABLE II: Validation of Daily new Infected and Death: UK (Class A), Germany (Class B), Italy (Class C), India (Class D)
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FIG. 6: Daily temporal evolution of the basic reproduction rate for countries from Class A (UK), Class B (Germany), Class C
(Italy) and Class D (India). The dotted line sets the pandemic threshold; count “0” starts at 14 February 2020, excluding data
for the first 19 days (statistics recorded 22 January 2020 onwards) due to low infection, and additional 4 days of gestation.
MCMC training between 10 February 2020 to 29 June 2020.
increasing statistics for the recovered, that then slows down as the infection peak arrives, eventually to tail off in to a no-infection
landscape. While the qualitative trends are similar for all classes (A, B, C, D) of countries, the impact of lockdown on the first
peak, and then a second (relapse) peak, hint at the internal health versus econometrics of the countries concerned. To prove this
point, we compare infection (and mortality) propagation kinetics of 2 chosen countries for two different dates, one on the recess
(UK: Figure 7), the other with uprising infection level (India: Figure 8). As opposed to the recent furore about school children
being exposed to the Covid-19 menace as a result of early lockdown withdrawal, our result clearly shows that there is practically
no difference in mortality between a withdrawal on June 1, 2020 as against a later withdrawal e.g. July 1, 2020 (although a
withdrawal on May 1 would have been disastrous). The 1 June (almost equally safe) withdrawal would, of course, be favoured
on economic and social grounds.
The third key outcome of our analysis is the establishment of mortality:infection ratio as the key descriptor of pandemic over
and above reproduction number, that has conventionally been used for the purpose. The proof of this is in the accurate prediction
of the secondary infection relapse time that the reproductive number fails to predict. As can be seen from Figures 7a and 7b,
this relapse time period could be deferred with a late lockdown withdrawal on July 1 (as compared to June 1) although the
peak mortality rates are not hugely different (ca 200 at 1 July compared to ca 400 at 1 June). Using 1 July 2020 as the UK
lockdown withdrawal date, there is a clear signature of secondary relapse in the first week of September (identified as the second
peak in Figure 7. The Indian situation is clearly more challenging, though, as shown in Figure 8. While perhaps economically
8unsustainable, India could benefit with a lockdown even beyond 31 July, 2020. For other nations like Iran, Portugal, France and
Poland, our predictions of non-trivial secondary relapses (all in late June) match almost perfectly with data, both infected and
dead.
(a) UK: 1 June 2020 (b) UK: 1 July 2020
FIG. 7: Lockdown withdrawal dates compared for the UK (partial decclared lockdown withdrawal on 23 March 2020).
Analysis is based on daily mortality statistics. The perpendicular dotted line represents lockdown withdrawal date. Here “0”
marks 22 January 2020.
(a) India: 31 July 2020 (b) India: 31 August 2020
FIG. 8: Lockdown withdrawal dates compared for India (partial lockdown withdrawal on 4 July 2020). Analysis is based on
daily mortality statistics. The perpendicular dotted line represents lockdown withdrawal date. Here “0” marks 22 January 2020.
A real point of contention amongst politicians, health professionals and medical scientists has, for long, been the correct
lockdown implementation and withdrawal times. In statistical parlance, this effectively amounts to an estimation of the FWHM
as has been estimated for Wuhan at 2.6 weeks from initial infection [32]. To analyze these counterclaims, we incorporate the
effects of withdrawal of lockdown as a country specific, dynamically evolving quantity.
In palpable absence of any functional vaccine or therapeutics, these results can provide a remarkable gateway to pandemic
strategizing, going beyond its immediate relevance. What quarantine strategy to choose and when to implement or withdraw it
9is of crucial importance, for which our model can serve as a future benchmark.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Motivation of the PHIRVD model
PHIRVD uniquely combines a dynamically evolving infection propagation model that tracks the phenomenology of infection
kinetics with a probabilistic predictive algorithm, the latter chosen as a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) kernel.
The Bayesian MCMC is used to train past data to predict time independent generic parameters that can predict the future
statistics. The choice is guided by the strength of Bayesian MCMC in a range of dynamical modeling studies in complementary
fields (32,33).
Reproduction number Re at fixed point
For γ = 0, δ = 0, from Eq. (1) the disease free equilibrium (DFE) or fixed point is given by P ∗ = H∗ h2vq2Pp2vq2H , I
∗ = 0, R∗ = 0,
V ∗ = H∗ h2vq2H . To evaluate the reproduction number Re, we have to break the equation of
dI
dt into two parts F ,V , i.e.,
dI
dt
= F − V (2)
where F = (β1H + β2P + β3R)I and V = (ζ + w)I . Now, F = ∂F∂I |DFE and Σ = ∂V∂I |DFE . Then Re = FΣ =
H∗
(
β2h2vq2P
p2vq2H
+β1
)
ζ+ω .
Lockdown Dynamics
During the time period, over which we trained our model, most of the countries (except Sweden), of our interest, were under
lockdown. Therefore, we studied the effects of withdrawal/relaxation of lockdown for some countries by introducing a time
varying parameter L(t) in the model in Eq. (1) substituting β1,2,3 with β1,2,3 L(t) respectively, where L(t) = 1, for t ≤
t0 and α for t ≥ t0 + k. For t0 < t < t0 + k, L(t) = 1k [α(t− t0) + (t0 + k− t)]. Here t0 marks the lockdown withdrawal time
point, k is the approximate time duration during which the susceptible and infected population mixes well (e.g. within one week
or one month etc.) and α is the parameter quantifying the homogeneity of mixing. The largest α value (sum of H , P , I , R, D
and V ) implies that almost all susceptible have been in contact with an infected person. The function L(t) is such that before
lockdown withdrawal, it does not alter the contact probability while after withdrawal, it linearly increases from the value 1 to α
over a time interval of k days, ensuring that the contact probability between susceptible and infected increases from a low to a
high value within this period.
Parameter Estimation
The Bayesian MCMC data training leading to supervised learning is itself conducted in two steps using a double-filtration
process. First, infection data alone are used to arrive at a preliminary set of values, characterizing each country. The said
values are then filtered through combined infected and mortality statistics for a second training to sequentially converge to a
preset upper limit. The training schedule is repeated multiply to ensure accurate predictions of the training dataset. Estimation
of the equilibrium reproduction number is strategically used to reduce the effective parameter space from 13 to 8 parameters,
perfectly conforming with the Bayesian MCMC prediction which shows that value fluctuations with other parameters do not
contribute much to the infection kinetics. The model clearly separates the H and P infection classes to reflect their differential
levels of infection and mortality. Another constituent is the death rate kinetics embedded in the central structure. The infection
propagation model outlined in Eq. (1) is a multi-parameter model whose parameters are evaluated using predictive data modeling
within the Bayesian MCMC construct. Similar structures have been selectively used in (19,23) albeit for single-country specific
models without any explicit mortality dynamics. Over-reliance on infection statistics has often led to incorrect estimation for
mortality statistics, whose accurate prediction is our first key target, an aim that is remarkably well served by our ML-embedded
compartmentalised model. We present both the cumulative and daily (inset plots) statistics of infected population over 400 days,
data trained between 10 February 2020 to 29 June 2020 (140 days) and then predicted up to the next 8 weeks (shown up to 12
July 2020 in Table 1).
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The Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm:
To understand how the algorithm uses the data to determine the parameters, it is useful to recall some elements of Bayesian
statistics (32, 33). Let D = (D1, D2, ..., Dn) represent the full data vector that is being used to train the algorithm. For our
case, the subscripts run over both the time intervals (daily) as well as the data types, such as Ic(ti) and D(ti). Similarly, let
Θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θα) represent the vector of parameters. A key ingredient is the prior probabibility distribution (Bayesian priors)
for each θi. While the absence of any knowledge of the system would call for a prior that is flat in the physically allowed
region, the incorporation of such knowledge (which, in the present context, could be divined from the analysis of, say even
part of the data for a single country in a given class) quickly gives the prior a somewhat peaked structure. In other words,
one could as well start with a normal-distributed prior, viz., Θ ∼ N(Θ0, σ), where the vector Θ0 represents the mean of the
parameters and σ = (σ1, σ2, ..., σα) the standard deviation. As it turns out, the dependence of the final result on the prior is
quite insignificant.Given a Θ, it is straightforward to calculate the conditional probability P(D|Θ) of obtaining a realizationD
for the data. Using Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability for Θ given the data is expressed as
P(Θ|D) = P(D|Θ)P(Θ)
P(D)
, (3)
where P(D) =
∫
Ω
P(D|Θ)P(Θ)dΘ, with Ω denoting the whole parameter space. This, immediately leads us to the likelihood
ratio of two parameter vectors Θ1 and Θ2, namely
P(Θ2|D)
P(Θ1|D) =
P(D|Θ2)P(Θ2)
P(D|Θ1)P(Θ1) . (4)
We now resort to a 3-step algorithm:
1. Choose parameters (including initial conditions) through a random walk in the parameter space. The nature of the random
walk is determined by the prior probability distributions for the parameters, including initial conditions.
2. Calculate the likelihood ratio function for the parameters, given the data.
3. Decide whether to accept the suggested parameter set or not.
Step 1:
Let Si = (Si1, Si2, ..., Sin) be the simulated vector at the ith step for parameter values Θi = (θi1, θi2, ..., θiα). Compared to
the total population, the data Ic(t), D(t) etc. are quasi-continuous and can be assumed to be drawn from a Normal distribution
with respective standard deviations Γ = (γ1, γ2, ..., γn) and means Si = (Si1, Si2, ..., Sin). Therefore, the posterior probability
(or likelihood, in case of continuous probability density) of the parameter vector Θi is,
P(Θi|D) = P(D|Θi)P(Θi)P(D) = (2pi)
−(n+α)/2
 n∏
j=1
γj
α∏
β=1
σβP(D)
−1 exp
−1
2
n∑
j=1
(
Sij −Dj
γj
)2 . (5)
Next, we execute a random walk in Θ-space with distribution N(Θi, σ) to find Θi+1, and calculate again the posterior likeli-
hood function, with the simulated data vector Si+1, corresponding to the parameter vector Θi+1 as
P(Θi+1|D) =
P(D|Θi+1)P(Θi+1)
P(D)
= (2pi)−(n+α)/2
 n∏
j=1
γj
α∏
β=1
σβP(D)
−1 exp
− 1
2
n∑
j=1
(
S(i+1)j −Dj
γj
)2
− 1
2
α∑
β=1
(
θ(i+1)β − θiβ
σβ
)2 . (6)
Step 2:
The likelihood ratio is now calculated to be P(Θi+1|D)/P(Θi|D).
Step 3:
Next, we generate a uniform random number r ∼ U [0, 1]. If r < P(Θi+1|D)/P(Θi|D), we accept Θi+1, otherwise we go
back to Step 1 and repeat the procedure.
We have used cumulative infected and dead data as the vector D and we normalize (as described above) the data vector
D, as well as the simulated vector Si at every step, before calculating the likelihood ratio in Step 2 above. We have used
σ = (σP ,σIC), where σP = (0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01) only for parameters part, σIC =
(0.1, 0.1, 0.001, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0) for initial data part, and Γ = (γ1, γ2, ..., γn), where γj = (0.1 − 0.05)(j − 1)/(n − 1) + 0.05.
The initial days (where the numbers are low) in the data are given relatively smaller weightage than the later days for fitting, as
the noise level is higher initially, than the signal.
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Estimation of the reproduction number kinetics
Understandably, the basic reproduction number R0 is no longer a constant. Defining R0(t) as the average number of secondary
infections from a primary case at a given epoch t, and similarly Id(t) as the number of daily new cases, we have
Id(t) =
∫ ∞
0
R0(t) Id(t− τ) g(τ) dτ, (7)
where g(τ) is the probability density function of the generation time τ , defined as the time required for a new secondary infection
to be generated from a primary infection. In other words, τ is the time interval between the onset of a primary case to the onset
of a secondary case, generated from this primary case. As is reported (26), the mean generation time is approximately 6.5 days,
we assume g(τ) has a Gamma distribution with g(τ) = Gamma(6.5, 0.62). We represent R0(t) as a function of time as
R0(t) =
Id(t)∫∞
0
Id(t− τ) g(τ) dτ
. (8)
We approximate the denominator of equation (8) directly from our simulated data, by a discrete sum, and evaluate R0 at nth day
as
R0(n) =
Id(t)∫∞
0
Id(t− τ) g(τ) dτ
≈ Id(n)
n−1∑
τ=0
Id(n− τ) g(τ)
. (9)
Statistical error estimation and p-values
Using the Chi-square statistic as χ2 ≡
n∑
i=1
(
Di−Si
Si+1
)2
(0 <  < 1), where Di are observed data and Si the simulated data for
the ith day, we quantify the accuracy of our model fitting with the real data. Understandably, the data for daily new infections
and daily new deaths are contaminated by noise, more severely than the corresponding cumulative data. Hence, a Chi-square
test applied on cumulative data will always give a high p-value. However, to test the power of our predictive machine learning
algorithm, we calculated the p-values on daily new data of deaths and infected. Assuming the real data are drawn from a normal
distribution with mean value same as the simulated data, and with a standard deviation equal to some fraction of the simulated
data, we derive our Chi-square statistic. Although, the real data of infected and dead are always positive, as the infection
increases, this assumption is very well valid, except for a very small time interval at the starting of infection in a population.
DATA AND MATERIALS AVAILABILITY
Data from the Johns Hopkins repository (https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/Covid-19) were used, together
with country specific repositories, e.g. US: https://usafacts.org; EU: https://data.europa.eu/; UK:
https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/; India: https://www.covid19india.org/. All the epidemiological
information we used is documented in the Extended Data and Supplementary Tables. The codes and relevant files are made
available through the Aston Data Repository.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION APPENDIX (SI)
Data training: In order to establish the predictive strength of this machine Learning enforced model, in the appendices, we
trained the data between 10 February to 10 May and predicted for the next 30 days (until 9 June 2020). This is uniformly done
for all countries.
Appendix I: Reproduction Number Dynamics for Class A, B, C, D Countries
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(b) Class B countries and Vietnam (for comparison)
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(c) Class C countries
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(d) Class D countries
FIG. S1: Temporal evolution of the basic reproduction rate for all 4 infection classes, on a day by day basis. The dotted line at
R0 = 1 points to the optimum above which the epidemic to pandemic regime starts.
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Country Daily New Infected Daily New Death
 p-value  p-value
Australia 0.48 0.31 0.12 0.18
Korea 0.6 0.48 0.3 0.19
NY state, USA 0.55 0.24 0.45 0.17
Poland 0.45 0.67 0.25 0.28
Russia 0.55 0.14 0.25 0.19
Belgium 0.55 0.46 0.35 0.26
Brazil 0.6 0.37 0.45 0.46
Hubei 1 0 1 0
Portugal 0.5 0.17 0.19 0.69
Spain 0.75 0.19 0.5 0.87
Sweden 0.6 0.28 0.5 0.2
Vietnam 0.9 0 0.1 1
Netherlands 0.4 0.63 0.31 0.41
Iran 0.45 0.21 0.35 0.37
TABLE S1: p-Values for daily new infected and dead for other Class A-D countries between 10 Feb to 10 May 2020. The
statistic χ2D ≡
n∑
i=1
(
Di−Si
Si+1
)2
(0 <  < 1) represents the chi-square value, where Di are observed data and Si the simulation
data for the ith day.
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Appendix II: Infection and mortality plots for countries in Classes A, B, C and D
(a) Netherlands infection profiles. (b) Netherlands mortality profiles.
FIG. S2: Infection (S2a) and mortality (S2b) epidemiology for Netherlands (Class A). The outsets all represent the cumulative
statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
(a) New York State infection profiles. (b) New York State mortality profiles.
FIG. S3: Infection (S3a) and mortality (S3b) epidemiology for New York State (Class A). The outsets all represent the
cumulative statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
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(a) Sweden infection profiles. (b) Sweden mortality profiles.
FIG. S4: Infection (S4a) and mortality (S4b) epidemiology for Sweden (Class A). The outsets all represent the cumulative
statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
(a) Korea infection profiles. (b) Korea mortality profiles.
FIG. S5: Infection (S5a) and mortality (S5b) epidemiology for Korea (Class B). The outsets all represent the cumulative
statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
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(a) Vietnam infection profiles. (b) Vietnam mortality profiles.
FIG. S6: Infection (S6a) and mortality (S6b) epidemiology for Vietnam. The outsets all represent the cumulative statistics
while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
(a) Russia infection profiles. (b) Russia mortality profiles.
FIG. S7: Infection (S7a) and mortality (S7b) epidemiology for Russia (Class B). The outsets all represent the cumulative
statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
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(a) Australia infection profiles. (b) Australia mortality profiles.
FIG. S8: Infection (S8a) and mortality (S8b) epidemiology for Australia (Class B). The outsets all represent the cumulative
statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
(a) Spain infection profiles. (b) Spain mortality profiles.
FIG. S9: Infection (S9a) and mortality (S9b) epidemiology for Spain (Class C). The outsets all represent the cumulative
statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
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(a) Hubei infection profiles. (b) Hubei mortality profiles.
FIG. S10: Infection (S10a) and mortality (S10b) epidemiology for Hubei (Class C). The outsets all represent the cumulative
statistics while the insets are for daily updates in the number of infected and death respectively.
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(a) UK: 1 May 2020 (b) UK: 1 June 2020
(c) UK: 1 July 2020
FIG. S11: UK cumulative infected prediction for 3 different withdrawal dates - 1 May 2020, 1 June 2020, 1 July 2020.
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(a) UK: 1 May 2020 (b) UK: 1 June 2020
(c) UK: 1 July 2020
FIG. S12: UK Lockdown prediction for 3 different withdrawal dates - 1 May 2020, 1 June 2020, 1 July 2020.
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FIG. S13: Iran cumulative infected and mortality prediction for lockdown withdrawal on 20 April 2020.
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FIG. S14: France cumulative infected and mortality prediction for lockdown withdrawal on 10 May 2020.
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FIG. S15: Brazil cumulative infected and mortality prediction for lockdown withdrawal on 10 May 2020.
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FIG. S16: Poland cumulative infected and mortality prediction for lockdown withdrawal on 10 May 2020.
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FIG. S17: Portugal cumulative infected and mortality prediction for lockdown withdrawal on 10 May 2020.
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(a) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for the UK (b) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for the
Netherlands
(c) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Sweden (d) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for New York
State
FIG. S18: Full Simulation plots for Class A countries.
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(a) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Germany (b) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Korea
(c) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Australia (d) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Russia
(e) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Vietnam
FIG. S19: Full Simulation plots for Class B countries.
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(a) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Italy (b) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Spain
(c) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Hubei
FIG. S20: Full Simulation plots for Class C countries.
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(a) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for India (b) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Iran
(c) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Australia (d) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for France
(e) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Portugal (f) Full simulation plots including all 6 dimensions for Brazil
FIG. S21: Full Simulation plots for Class D countries.
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Appendix III: Comparative Estimation: Data versus Model Prediction Table
PPPPPPPDays
Country
Netherlands Sweden New York State, USA Belgium
Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death
Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation
31/05/20 102 151 5 26 775 266 65 45 1329 395 51 51 98 144 19 45
01/06/20 86 145 10 25 2214 260 74 44 1045 368 51 48 70 138 17 43
02/06/20 209 139 13 24 1080 254 20 43 1048 343 155 45 82 132 26 41
03/06/20 210 134 15 23 1056 248 77 42 1075 319 62 42 140 126 18 39
04/06/20 183 128 6 22 948 242 17 41 1108 297 44 39 165 120 14 37
05/06/20 239 123 2 21 843 237 3 41 781 277 94 36 154 115 15 36
06/06/20 165 118 3 20 403 231 35 40 702 258 43 34 122 110 11 34
07/06/20 164 113 15 19 791 226 23 39 683 240 41 31 89 105 13 33
08/06/20 184 109 11 19 890 221 78 38 674 224 84 29 132 100 10 31
09/06/20 164 105 2 18 1474 216 19 37 736 208 38 27 142 96 7 30
TABLE S2: Validation of Daily new Infected and Death: Netherlands, Sweden, New York State, Belgium (Class A)
PPPPPPPDays
Country
Korea Australia Russia
Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death
Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation
31/05/20 49 8 1 0 8 2 0 0 8858 9766 182 168
01/06/20 39 8 0 0 11 2 0 0 8529 9632 177 167
02/06/20 39 8 0 0 7 2 0 0 8823 9497 168 167
03/06/20 51 7 0 0 5 1 0 0 8718 9364 144 1660
04/06/20 57 7 0 0 7 1 0 0 8846 9231 197 165
05/06/20 38 7 0 0 6 1 0 0 8971 9100 134 164
06/06/20 38 7 1 0 2 1 0 0 8970 8970 112 163
07/06/20 50 6 2 0 7 1 0 0 8587 8841 171 162
08/06/20 45 6 0 0 11 1 0 0 8393 8714 216 161
09/06/20 56 6 1 0 4 1 0 0 8777 8588 172 159
TABLE S3: Validation of Daily new Infected and Death: Korea, Australia, Russia (Class B)
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PPPPPPPDays
Country
Spain Hubei Province, China
Infected Death Infected Death
Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation
31/05/20 294 95 0 21 0 4 0 1
01/06/20 394 88 1 20 0 4 0 1
02/06/20 334 82 5 18 0 4 0 1
03/06/20 318 75 1 17 0 3 0 1
04/06/20 332 70 1 15 0 3 0 1
05/06/20 240 64 1 14 0 3 0 1
06/06/20 167 60 0 13 0 3 0 1
07/06/20 249 55 0 12 0 3 0 1
08/06/20 314 51 0 11 0 3 0 1
09/06/20 427 47 0 10 0 3 0 1
TABLE S4: Validation of Daily new Infected and Death: Spain, Hubei (Class C)
PPPPPPPDays
Country
Poland Iran Francs Portugal Brazil
Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death Infected Death
Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation Data Simulation
31/05/20 230 231 18 15 3117 2222 64 150 0 375 107 59 195 279 12 12 28936 8346 1262 1242
01/06/20 292 222 23 15 3134 2152 70 147 3856 370 81 59 366 269 11 12 28633 7777 1349 1229
02/06/20 361 213 2 15 3574 2073 59 144 0 365 43 59 331 258 8 12 30925 7269 1473 1212
03/06/20 362 204 20 14 2886 1987 63 140 552 359 46 58 377 247 10 12 30830 6815 1005 1192
04/06/20 576 196 16 14 2269 1896 75 136 529 354 31 58 382 237 9 11 27075 6409 904 1170
05/06/20 575 189 4 14 2364 1803 72 131 293 347 13 57 342 226 5 11 18912 6043 525 1146
06/06/20 599 181 9 14 2043 1707 70 126 98 341 53 56 192 216 6 11 15654 5712 679 1120
07/06/20 400 175 17 13 2095 1612 74 120 141 334 84 56 421 206 7 11 32091 5413 1272 1094
08/06/20 282 168 23 13 2011 1517 81 115 397 327 23 55 294 196 5 10 32913 5141 1274 1066
09/06/20 359 162 9 13 2218 1415 78 109 358 320 27 54 310 187 7 10 30412 4892 1239 1039
TABLE S5: Validation of Daily new Infected and Death: Poland, Iran, France, Portugal, Brazil (Class D)
